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Abstract. This paper proposes an optimization method for the design of
large scale confederation based BGP networks. We propose a graph based
model and an associated metric to evaluate the reliability of large scale
autonomous systems. We propose and validate an effective methodology
to find the optimal design for a given physical topology. According to our
experiments, we consider that replacing the traditional IBGP topology by
an appropriate confederation design could increase at the same time the
scalability and the reliability into the domain. Our work might be a step
further towards a large scale confederation deployment.
1 Introduction
The confederation topology is one solution to control IBGP scalability into a
large Autonomous System. Although, some general guidelines propose to follow
the physical topology and use a hub-and-spoke architecture [9], a dedicated ana-
lytical design methodology has not yet been developed. This issue is of extreme
importance for large networks and complex topologies. Questions such as ”how
many sub-AS do we need?” and ”where is the border of each sub-AS?”, do not
have answers based on a theoretical approach.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the BGP protocol
and highlights the scalability problem and the current approaches to deal with.
Section 3 presents the requirements of confederation reliability and gives hints
for optimal confederation design. Section 4 presents a network model and pro-
poses metrics and constraints to create a confederation framework. Solving of the
reliability-aware design problem together with implementation and experimental
results are in section 4 as well. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 BGP protocol and scaling large ASs
Today’s Internet is structured according to separate administrative domains,
called autonomous systems ASs, where each has its own independent routing
policies. The Internal Gateway Protocol IGP is responsible for packets forward-
ing within a domain. The Border gateway protocol BGP is currently the de
facto standard protocol for inter domain routing in the Internet. The routers
running BGP are called speakers, and a neighbor connection (also referred as
peer connection) can be established between two speakers over TCP. If the two
speakers are within the same AS, BGP is called internal BGP (IBGP), while
two speakers residing in two different ASs and directly attached by a physical
segment can established a BGP session and in this case we have an external
BGP session (EBGP). The speakers using EBGP are called border routers.
Fig. 1. IBGP and EBGP
Figure 1 shows an example of three ASs, the nodes represent BGP speakers
and the solid lines represent physical links. We have two EBGP sessions between
A and Q and between B and P, which are border routers, and six IBGP sessions
forming a logical full mesh. The border routers A and B inform all the speakers
within the domain (by IBGP) about the reachable network addresses outside
the domain (learned by EBGP).
EBGP speakers can detect routing loops by the AS-path BGP attribute. But
inside the AS, a full mesh of IBGP sessions between speakers is required. The
problem with the IBGP mesh is that it is not scalable. If a mesh between n
routers has to be deployed, each router handles concurrently n−1 sessions. As n
grows, routers with higher CPU power and larger memory are required to process
and maintain routing information. To solve the IBGP scalability problem, the
network community has proposed two practical approaches: Route Reflection
and confederation [3].
The route reflection method elects some routers to be route reflectors, and
then clusters are formed by assigning clients to each route reflector. The full mesh
is only required between reflectors and each client only communicates with its
reflector. This method has advantages such as low migration complexity be-
cause there is no need to reconfigure all the routers, and it supports hierarchical
structures.
The underlying idea of the confederation is to divide a large AS into a num-
ber of smaller autonomous systems, called member AS or sub-AS. Each sub-AS
will have a different AS number. The direct consequence is that External BGP
sessions must be deployed between them. This sessions are called intra confed-
eration EBGP sessions, because they are slightly different of the regular EBGP
sessions. Inside each sub-AS, a full IBGP mesh is required, but we can also
deploy a route reflection architecture.
From the outside, a confederation looks like a single AS, because it doesn’t
expose its internal topology when advertising routes to EBGP neighbors. An ex-
terior AS, basing its routing policy on AS path length, will count a confederation
like one hop while the traffic may pass through multiple sub-ASs. Since there
may be a shorter path that doesn’t include the confederation, this will cause sub-
optimal routing. Moreover, in standard BGP, sub-ASs do not alter the overall
AS-path length, which causes sub-optimal routing inside the confederation.
The advantage of the confederation design with respect to the route reflectors
design is its scaling potential for the IGP protocol. An IGP protocol can be run
on one sub-AS totally independent from running other IGPs on other sub-ASs,
which helps to control the instability of IGP in a large autonomous system. For
more details on BGP, route reflection and confederation issues, the reader is
invited to consult the excellent BGP overview in [3].
3 Guidelines for optimizing confederation networks
A good BGP network design must satisfy the following requirements: reduced
complexity, simple routing procedure and in the same time high reliability.
The hub-and-Spoke architecture is advised in the literature([9],[3]). One sub-
AS forms a backbone and play the role of a transit center. All other members
connect exclusively with it. The goal of such design is to reduce the number of
intra-confederation EBGP sessions, because if a sub-AS has multiple EBGP ses-
sions, it will receive multiple copies of the same routes, which means redundant
traffic and processing. The other benefit is the consistency and the predictability
of the routing. Uniformly, a traffic entering the confederation from one sub-AS
will take two hops to get out by another sub-AS.
But in term of network resilience, a reduced number of intra confederation
sessions may be a bad design in case of component failures: for example if one
sub-AS is connected to the backbone sub-AS via one session carried by one
physical link, the failure of this link or one of the two end routers causes the
complete isolation of this sub-AS from the rest of the confederation. A second
example is when multiple sub-ASs are connected to the backbone sub-AS and
all the sessions are initiated exclusively with the same router. The failure of this
transit router transforms the confederation into islands. In backbone networks,
there is a small probability that two components fail in the same time, or that the
second component fails before we recover the first one. Under this assumption,
a topology where there are two independent sessions formed by independent
physical components (router, physical-link, router) between every sub-AS and
the transit sub-AS, prevents the isolation between sub-ASs.
The authors in [8] propose an IBGP route reflection optimization algorithm,
based on the expected session loss metric. This work is focused on optimizing
route reflection architectures. The damage caused by a BGP session failure is:
1) the invalidation of routing entries, which are directly or indirectly related to
this session, 2) the consequent route flaps, 3) the unreachable network addresses,
or 4) the potential isolation of two parts of the network. Inside each sub-AS, an
IBGP mesh must be deployed. When two routers don’t have a direct physical
link to build a peer session, they use IGP routing tables to make a multi-hop
TCP connection and establish an IBGP session. The result is that some physical
links will support multiple sessions, and some routers may be also in the path
of sessions that it doesn’t initiate. When a component (router or link) fails, the
overlying sessions may break down.
The session failure is of probabilistic nature [4]. If a router fails, all the
initiated sessions will break down, and with certain probability the sessions which
pass through it will also fail. If a physical link fails, then each of its overlying
sessions may break down with certain probability.
A good sub-AS design should prevent a high expected session loss. The guide-
line is to follow the logical topology by the physical topology [9]. A sub-AS struc-
ture with a physical segment for every two of its IBGP speakers, limits the loss
to probably one session per link failure, and certainly all the initiated sessions
per router failure.
4 Reliable confederation topology design
4.1 Network models
We represent the physical network in the AS as a graph G(V, E), where V rep-
resent the set of routers and E represent the set of physical links. We denote
(i, j) ∈ E the edge between node i ∈ V and node j ∈ V. Typically, there are
some routers that don’t run BGP, we denote Vr the set of routers running BGP,
Vr ⊆ V, and we define n = |Vr| as the number of BGP speakers. We focus on
a transit domain where V = Vr, and we consider that our model can be simply
extended to be applicable on a general case. A reliability model is inherently
bounded to the reliability of single components like routers and physical links.
The reliability of a router is strongly related to its resource consumption (CPU
for route processing, and memory for routing table). When the number of ses-
sions handled concurrently increases over a certain threshold, the router can no
longer maintain an up-to-date map. In a confederation topology, except bor-
der routers, a router must manage sessions just with the speakers of its sub-AS
rather than all the speakers of the AS. The scalability problem is solved this way.
Let vi be the proportion of time where router i has a healthy status. vi can be
assigned based on monitoring history or estimated basing on CPU performance
and memory capacity. Likewise, we represent the reliability of a link (i, j) by a
value wij , which is the proportion of time where the link works properly. If no
physical link between i and j, wij = 0.
In a logical topology formed by k sub-ASs, each sub-AS is represented by
a sub-graph and assigned a number SAS, 1 ≤ SAS ≤ k. The logical model
G(V, E , f) is obtained by characterizing the physical model by a function f :
V 7→ [1, k]. f assigns for each node the sub-graph that contains it. The main
property of f is that it divides the graph into connected sub-graphs. Basing
on f , we can calculate the number of nodes of a sub graph by the formula:
y(SAS) = card({i ∈ V; f(i) = SAS}). The number of edges between the nodes
of the same sub-graph can be also calculated: m(SAS) = card({(i, j) ∈ E ; f(i) =
f(j) = SAS}). We can denote the border routers by a function b: b(i) = 1 if ∃j ∈
V; (i, j) ∈ E ∧ f(i) 6= f(j). So b(i) = 1 if i is a border router and 0 else. To build
an EBGP session, two border routers must be in different sub-ASs. We use a
function s to detect this property, i, j ∈ V : s(i, j) = 1 if f(i) 6= f(j) and 0
otherwise.
4.2 Problem statement
Given the physical network topology G(V, E) of an autonomous system, find
among all the possible logical confederation topologies, the one having the best
reliability.
For example, we give the physical topology in figure 2. We suppose that one
or more of the seven routers don’t have the necessary performances to handle
six sessions concurrently. The problem is to divide the routers in a number of
sub-ASs and to optimize the reliability of the routing protocol.
i A G B F D C E
f(i) 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
b(i) 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
Fig. 2. Physical topology and associated solution-logical topology
The solution for this topology is depicted in the table of figure 2. A theoretical
justification of this choice can’t be completed without a study of the factors that
influence either IBGP or EBGP reliabilities. We will model these factors by a
suitable metric accompanied by three essential constraints.
4.3 Density metric and accompanying constraints
We define a metric capable to evaluate the difference between the physical topol-
ogy of a sub-graph and a Clique [2] of the same size. The motivation for our
approach is that a Clique has the weakest expected session loss and the highest
edge connectivity [1] (for a Clique of size n nodes the edge connectivity is n-1).
Our approach is to cut the network into a small number of dense sub-ASs. The
density notion was used in [7] to characterize the Internet hierarchy. We define
the Density of a sub-graph as the ratio of the number of its edges m to the num-
ber of edges required to accomplish a Clique between its nodes. For n nodes, we
need n×(n−1)2 edges to make a Clique.
D(SAS) =
m
y(SAS)×(y(SAS)−1)
2
We define the density of a graph k-cut (i.e. the graph is cut into k connected
sub-graphs) as the average of densities of its sub-graphs.
D =
∑k
SAS=1 D(SAS)
k
A logical topology which concentrates the edges in the sub-graphs reduces
in the same time the number of edges between the sub-graphs, and that the
number of EBGP sessions is minimized.
To address the EBGP resilience, we introduce here the cut reliability con-
straint. We define the reliability of intra-confederation EBGP as the sum of
reliabilities of the underlying network components (border routers and physical
links) and we denote it by R. R indicates approximately how many components
deploy EBGP and how much these components are reliable.
R =
∑
i∈V
vi × b(i) +
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij × b(i) × b(j) × s(i, j)
Our constraint requires that R should be greater than a certain threshold weighted
by a fraction α to the sum of reliabilities of the components of all the network.
RT =
∑
i∈V
vi +
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
The second constraint that we have used is limiting the number of sub-ASs.
The intra-confederation EBGP routing is not optimal without manually setting
BGP policies. When the number of sub-ASs increases, the IGP advantages be-
come non relevant. Thus, we choose not to exceed a certain threshold of number
of sub-ASs, otherwise we need much administration effort to save the stability
and the efficiency on the routing plan.
Finally, it is important to uniformly distribute the routers among the sub-
ASs. We balance between the numbers of IBGP sessions that a router will handle
concurrently, what protects certain routers from unsupportable resource con-
sumption, and we balance between the different IGP’s working in the sub-ASs.
The third constraint is so called the load balancing constraint.
4.4 Reliable confederation-density (RC-D) problem
Given a graph G(V, E), {vi} and {wij} reliability values of nodes and edges, the
RC-D problem aims to find k and the k-cut of the graph which maximize the
density metric while respecting the three constraints formulated below:
1. The cut reliability constraint: R > α × RT ;
2. The number of sub-AS constraint: 2 ≤ k < ⌈ln(n)⌉;
3. The load balancing constraint: ∀SAS; β × n
k
< y(SAS) < (2−β)×n
k
where we
choose β from [0.5, 0.9].
We can choose α and β and change the threshold of k to strengthen or relax
the constraints. A good choice requires practical experience and studying BGP
confederation history examples.
4.5 Heuristic solution for reliable confederation topology design
If k is fixed and the graph will be divided on exactly k sub-graphs, then we get
the k-RC-D problem. Solutions of the k-RC-D problem for k going from 2 to
⌈ln(n)⌉ can be compared to elect the optimum design. In this paper, we apply a
technique similar to one of the Min k-cut problem solving methods [6].
Our solution HS fixes k first and uses a randomized procedure called contract
next to divide the graph into k connected sub-graphs. the Contract procedure
chooses an edge from E randomly (the same probability for all the edges). The
chosen edge is erased and its two extremities are joined in one meta node. The
edges of each of the two extremities belong now to the new meta node. This
contraction is repeated iteratively and stops when we reach k meta nodes. The
nodes compacted on each meta node are returned as a connected sub-graph. The
output of this procedure is a logical topology and the associated function f is
represented by a list that assigns for every node in V the SAS of the sub-graph
containing it.
Next, HS calculates the cut reliability R, and the number of routers for
each sub-graph y(SAS). If the topology exceeds the reliability constraint or the
load balancing one, HS gives it a null density. Otherwise, HS calculates the
density of each sub-graph and then the average density. HS repeats this work
(contract+metric calculation) for n2× log n iterations like in the algorithm of the
Min k-cut to increase the chance to be close to the optimal solution. At the end
of this loop, HS picks the maximum density and the associated list representing
f as the response to the k-RC-D problem. To respond to the RC-D problem, HS
assigns to k all the integer values between 2 and ⌈ln(n)⌉, solves each of the k-RC-
D problems, and finally returns among all the k-RC-D solutions the one having
the maximum density. Thus, the complexity of our solution is O(n4(ln(n))2)
because the complexity of contract procedure is O(n2). The pseudo-code of HS
is depicted below:
for k = 2 to ⌈ln(n)⌉
for topology= 1 to n2 × log n
f[topology]=contract(G);
if (f[topology] satisfies constraints):
D top[topology] = calculate D(f[topology])
else:
D top[topology]=0
D k[k]= max(D top)
D opt=max(D k)
return(D opt,k opt,f opt)
4.6 Experimental results
We have implemented a brute force algorithm (ET) which works in exponential
time (kn), tries all combinations, generates all possible logical topologies and
returns exactly the maximum possible density. Our objective is to compare the
results of HS and those of ET.
Fig. 3. experimental results(1)
Physical network topologies are generated using the BRITE network topol-
ogy generator [5]. We have chosen BRITE because it is one of the generators
commonly used in the networks and Internet research community. We have cho-
sen to use the Heavy-tailed distribution to place the nodes and the Waxman
model to interconnect them. The reliabilities of physical links, wij , are gener-
ated randomly from the interval [0, 1.9] and the reliabilities of routers, vi, from
[0, 0.99]. We choose α = 1
n
for the cut reliability constraint and β = 0.5 for
the load balancing constraint. We have generated 33 physical topologies: 10 for
every network size of 10, 15 and 20 nodes, and 3 for the size of 25 nodes. For
each topology, we decided to cut the graph into two sub-graphs, so we fixed k
at 2, and we executed the two algorithms. Because it’s much harder for ET to
cut the graph into 3 sub-graphs for topologies of twenty nodes and more, we did
the comparison only for the first twenty topologies of sizes 10 and 15 nodes. The
two diagrams in figure 3 show the difference between the two algorithms.
For a given topology, the density of the optimal confederation design returned
by the ET algorithm is noted DET and the density of the one returned by the
HS algorithm is noted DHS , thus the relative error for a given topology is:
er =
DET − DHS
DET
× 100.
For each set of topologies of the same size, we have compared the average relative
error and the maximum relative error. The results are shown in the two diagrams
of figure 4. After interpreting these diagrams, we have concluded that the HS
algorithm could be a good solution to solve the RC-D problem.
Fig. 4. experimental results(2)
5 Conclusion
We have proposed in this paper a new method for optimizing BGP confedera-
tion networks. Our approach consists on determining a criteria for the sub-AS
IBGP resilience, as well as its integration in the global EBGP resilience model.
We have adopted a randomized algorithm to optimize the confederation design
with respect to our defined resilience, and we have experimentally evaluated its
performance.
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